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Editorials and Opinion Pieces


Aviation Security: distinct alternatives highlight party differences

BY: Damon Ansell & Emily Sedgwick
DATE: November 12, 2001
SECTION: Unpublished Editorial
LENGTH: 748 words

Recent news that Americans Airlines Flight 587 crashed into a residential neighborhood in Queens, New York, brought on a fresh bout of anguish and fear for Americans who were beginning to recover from the shock of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The November 12 crash in Queens may have been the fault of terrorist fury or some other cause, but the tragedy must remind federal lawmakers once again that they have the ability to change aviation security in dramatic ways. Whether they work to change aviation security for better or worse depends largely on whether the knee-jerk impulse to nationalize airport security prevails over the more rational alternative of federal oversight and a public-private partnership.

Two key bills in Congress exemplify these better- and worst-case scenarios. The better scenario, House bill 3150, would enhance security by creating federal certification requirements for airport baggage screeners. The screening process would be subject to federal standards, federal supervision, and strict federal oversight. The worst-case variation is to make all 28,000 baggage screeners federal employees. Putting baggage screeners on the federal payroll is one of two substantial differences between House bill 3150 and Senate bill 1447.

The other major difference between the competing House and Senate bills is the amount of tax imposed on travelers. To fly round-trip from Washington to San Francisco through Chicago would cost a traveler $5 if lawmakers adopt the House version, a tax of $2.50 per destination (San Francisco and Washington), regardless of layovers or rerouting. The Senate version would cost twice as much because the $2.50 tax applies every time the traveler boards a new plane: once in Washington, once in Chicago, and again on the way back both in San Francisco and in Chicago for a total of $10 in additional taxes.

True to form, Senator McCain doesn't seem to mind that nationalizing airport baggage screening will create an enormous new block of union voters on the government payroll. Not since the New Deal would so many new workers entered the government payroll system at one time. McCain, like another former Arizona Senator, Barry Goldwater, befuddles conservatives by strangely choosing to support leftist proposals for government intervention towards the end of his career.

McCain blasted his Republican counterparts in the House for passing a different aviation security bill than the supposedly "bi-partisan" (100-0 vote) bill in the Senate. McCain issued a statement November 1 saying that "the Senate bill passed with no dissention," when in fact Senate conservatives realized that they did not have the support necessary to stop the momentum building behind S. 1447 and instead punted the issue over to the House. Final passage of H. 3150 was 286-139 (McCain called this "a narrow four-vote margin"), a truly bipartisan vote. In fact, more House Democrats voted for H. 3150 than Senate Democrats voted for S. 1447.

The current debate in Congress regarding aviation security should take into account what has worked in other countries. Closer examination reveals that there are a whole host of countries that have tried and rejected the McCain/Daschle approach of federalizing baggage screeners. Terrorist events in the 1970s and 1980s forced governments in Europe and Israel to re-evaluate aviation security, with the eventual outcome of implementing private-sector security improvements.

In Israel, for example, the training and overall management of security officers is conducted by the public airport authority at Ben Gurion Airport, while a private company provides pre-boarding screening among other security functions. Another public-private partnership exists at the Gatwick Airport in London, where a public agency sets the standards for security precautions but a privatized company conducts checkpoint and baggage screening. The Dutch employ a similar system at the Schipol Airport in Amsterdam, where their Department of Justice administers standards, enforcement, and evaluations relating to security, but passenger and checked baggage screening occurs via contract with a private company. Brussels Airport and the Charles DeGaulle Airport in France conduct business in a similar fashion. All of these countries utilized a nationalized airport workforce prior to the terrorist events of the 1970s and 1980s.

The only extant system of federalized airport security conducting baggage screening occurs in China. The Senate over-reacted and chose the Chinese system to model new aviation security reform; the House has moved in the direction that Israel and Europe chose to handle security concerns after their nationalized airport security workforces failed to prevent terrorist attacks. The Israeli and European model has proven effective without the costly side-effects of federalizing everyone who works at an airport.