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POLICY BRIEF FROM AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM
Pension Liberation
for Florida
By Peter J. Ferrara
April 18, 2000
In this Policy Brief:
Introduction
Over the past 20 years, private sector
employers have shifted sharply towards "defined contribution"
pension programs. Under these programs, the employer pays a specified
amount into an investment account for the worker and these funds, plus
accumulated returns over the years, finance retirement benefits. The
number of private sector employees in such plans soared from 11 million
in 1975 to 43 million in 1995, an increase of about 300%.
By contrast, traditional defined benefit
employer plans have stagnated. Under these plans, the employer promises
a specified retirement benefit and saves and invests the funds in a
common pool to finance those benefits. From 1975 to 1995, the number
of private sector employees in such plans grew by less than 10%, from
33 million to 36 million. More private sector workers are now in defined
contribution plans than defined benefit plans.
A trend is now developing among the
states to begin to shift public employer pensions towards defined contribution
plans as well. Michigan adopted a comprehensive defined contribution
system for state workers in 1996. California adopted an option for some
of its workers that year as well. Ten states have now adopted defined
contribution reforms for a portion of their workers. Legislation extending
such reform to more workers is now pending in 20 states, and formal
legislative studies regarding possible reform are under way in 12 other
states.
Florida is now poised to become the
leader in this national movement. House Budget Committee Chairman Ken
Pruitt (R) has introduced comprehensive, pathbreaking legislation giving
all government employees in the Florida Retirement System the option
of a personal defined contribution retirement plan instead.
The effort in the Florida Senate, led
by Locke Burt, would raise current benefits, cut the vesting period
to five years, and raise pensions for law enforcement. It also has a
defined contribution element, which is being considered in the Committee
on Governmental Oversight and Productivity, chaired by Senator Jack
Latvala. This report will focus on the House version, however, and will
be updated when a final bill reaches the desk of Governor Bush.
Pension reform would provide important
benefits for both workers and taxpayers. For workers, the defined contribution
plan would be fully portable. Workers would be able to take the funds
paid into their accounts wherever they go. Those who work for a few
years in the public sector and then move on, as most now do, would not
lose all of their employer pension contributions, as they do under the
current Florida Retirement System. Moreover, the funds are under the
control of each worker. They don't have to worry about politicians mishandling
the funds, accumulating unfunded liabilities, or cutting their benefits.
With full, unbiased, market returns on their retirement account investments,
short- and medium-term workers employed by the government for less than
15 to 20 years would get higher benefits through the personal account
defined contribution system. Indeed, even longer-term workers may well
earn higher benefits than promised in the state's current defined benefit
plan. Finally, such reform provides workers with broader freedom of
choice.
For taxpayers, the defined contribution
plan avoids the risks of having the government responsible for investing
huge pools of retirement funds. Instead, the government's expenses are
fixed as a percentage of payroll each year, with no investment risk
or danger of unfunded liabilities. This promotes certainty and stability
in budgeting. In addition, the simple defined contribution plan saves
the state large amounts in administrative costs, and possibly funding
costs as well. At the same time, because of the above benefits of defined
contribution plans for workers, such plans will help public employers
recruit the best workers.
Basically, the defined contribution
plan privatizes the investment function of the public employee pension
system, producing these and other benefits. For all of these reasons,
the movement towards defined contribution reforms in public employment
pensions is called pension liberation
This report will present the case for
adopting pension liberation reform in Florida. It will first describe
the Florida public employee retirement system. It will then explain
the reform proposed by Chairman Pruitt. It will then discuss in more
detail the advantages of such a defined contribution option for both
workers and taxpayers. The following section will respond to various
criticisms. Finally, the report will summarize the reforms adopted and
proposed in other states.
The Florida Retirement System
for Public Employees (1)
The Florida Retirement System (FRS)
is a standard defined benefit plan. It covers all full- or part-time
employees working for a state agency, county government, school district,
state university, or community college. Cities and special local government
districts can also choose to have their workers participate. About 600,000
government workers overall participate in the FRS. The system pays close
to $2 billion each year in retirement, survivors' and disability benefits
to about 165,000 beneficiaries.
Close to 90% of workers and beneficiaries
are in the standard, Regular Class of system participants. A separate
Special Risk Class includes law enforcement officers, firefighters and
correctional officers. About 9% of workers and 5% of beneficiaries are
in this class. Still another class, the Elected Officers Class, includes
elected state and county officials, state Cabinet officers, state judges
and state attorneys. Less than 1% of workers and retirees fall in this
class. Another special group is the Senior Management Service Class,
which consists of the senior managers of state, county and city governments,
state universities, community colleges, school districts, and legislative
and judicial staffs. This group also covers less than 1% of workers
and retirees. The smallest group is the Special Risk Administrative
Support Class, which includes former Special Risk Class members who
moved to non-risk administrative positions in their agencies.
Workers pay no contributions to the
Florida Retirement System. All contributions are paid by the government
employer. The current employer contribution rate for Regular Class employees
is 9.21% of wages for retirement, survivors' and disability benefits.
Another 0.94% of wages is paid for the Retiree Health Insurance Subsidy,
for a total employer contribution rate of 10.15% for Regular Class employees.
Contribution rates for the other classes run higher because of the riskier
benefits paid to them.
Benefits vest for Regular Class members
and the Special Risk Classes after 10 years. However, for Elected Class
members, benefits vest after 8 years, and for the Senior Management
Class, benefits vest after 7 years.
Except for those with special-risk
service, workers in the FRS can start receiving full benefits at age
62, as long as they are fully vested. They can also receive full benefits
after 30 years of service, regardless of age. Those in special-risk
employment can retire with full benefits at age 55 with 10 years of
special-risk service, or at any age with 25 years of special risk service.
Workers can take early retirement at any time after they are fully vested,
but their benefits will be reduced by 5% for each year their age is
below the normal retirement age.
The benefit amount is calculated as
a percentage of average final compensation (AFC). AFC is simply the
average of the five highest years of wages in covered government employment.
For Regular Class workers, the percentage for those retiring at the
normal retirement age (62 or 30 years of service) is 1.6% times years
of service. So a worker retiring at age 62 with 20 years of service
would receive 32% times AFC. A worker retiring with 30 years of service
would receive 48% times AFC.
Regular Class workers retiring at age
63 or with 31 years of service receive 1.63% times years of service.
Those retiring at age 64 or with 32 service years receive 1.65% times
years of service. Those retiring at age 65 or with 33 years of service
receive 1.68% times years of service.
The percentage now for workers in the
Special-Risk Class is 3% times years of service, but varying amounts
between 2% and 3 % are provided for years of service before 1993. For
those in the Special-Risk Administrative Support Class who have 10 years
of special-risk service, the percentages are the same as for the Regular
Class, except they start with age 55 or 25 years of service as the normal
retirement age. Elected officers receive 3% times years of service,
except for judges, whose percentage is 3.33% per year. The Senior Management
Service Class gets 2% per year.
The FRS provides a flat 3% annual cost
of living increase for retirees each July. At retirement, workers can
choose to reduce their benefits under various options in return for
a continued benefit after their death for a surviving spouse or other
beneficiary.
If a worker dies while acting in the
line of duty, the surviving spouse will receive a survivors' benefit
equal to one half of the deceased's salary for the rest of the survivor's
life. The benefit will continue for any unmarried children below age
18 if the surviving spouse dies.
Survivors' benefits are also available
for the death of a worker before retirement outside the line of duty,
if the worker has 10 years of service. For a surviving spouse or other
adult beneficiary, the benefit is equal to the retirement benefit the
deceased worker would have received if he or she had retired on the
date of death, payable for the rest of the beneficiary's life. A child
named as the beneficiary would receive the deceased's retirement benefit
until the child reaches 25, unless the child is disabled at that time,
in which case the benefit continues as long as the disability continues.
Apart from a death in the line of duty, no survivors' benefits are payable
today for current workers who die with less than 10 years of service.
Disability benefits are payable to
workers who become totally and permanently disabled and unable to work.
Current workers must be vested with 10 years of service to receive disability
benefits, except for disability incurred in the line of duty, for which
benefits are available upon employment. For regular disability, the
minimum benefit is 25% of AFC. For in line of duty disability, the minimum
benefit is 42% of AFC. If the worker's retirement benefit on the date
of disability would be higher, then the worker receives that benefit.
FRS retirees also receive a health
insurance subsidy to pay for health coverage costs. The subsidy amount
is $5 per month for each year of service, subject to a maximum of $150
and a minimum of $50.
Workers who leave covered government
employment before vesting, again 10 years for the great majority of
workers, receive nothing from the current FRS. All employer contributions
paid for such workers are then diverted to the longer-term workers.
Workers who leave covered employment after vesting still cannot take
their retirement funds with them. They can only wait until they declare
retirement and then take the retirement benefits for which they are
eligible based on their limited period of service. No survivors' or
disability benefits are payable for those who have left covered government
employment.
The FRS achieved fully funded status
in 1998. That means the system has enough funds on hand on an actuarial
basis to pay all earned benefits. The system holds total assets of about
$110 billion, with about 70% invested in domestic and foreign equities.
Assets have been growing at about 20% since 1995, reflecting double-digit
investment returns. The average annual retirement benefit paid by the
system is only about $10,700.
A few government employees in Florida
already have a defined contribution alternative to the FRS. State university
faculty and administrators can choose the Optional Retirement Program
in place of the FRS. The university employer pays into a personal investment
account for the worker the same amount that it would have paid to the
FRS. These funds fully vest to the worker immediately upon payment to
the account.
The worker then chooses an investment
management company from a list approved by the state, which then invests
the funds for the worker. Part of the worker's contribution pays for
private life insurance to provide survivors' benefits. The worker can
make additional tax-free contributions to the account up to the amount
contributed by the employer.
About 10,000 workers participate in
this alternative program. It was established to create a more desirable,
fully portable system to help the state attract the best possible university
faculty and administrators. This program consequently shows recognition
of the problems of the FRS for workers.
Indeed, another defined contribution
option is available to a small number of additional employees. The Senior
Management Service Optional Annuity is available in place of the FRS
to workers in the state Senior Management Service, selected managerial
staff of the state legislature, the Auditor General and his managerial
staff, the Executive Director of the Ethics Commission, senior managers
of the State Board of Administration, and selected managerial staff
of the Judicial Branch and the Department of Military Affairs.
This program is virtually identical
to the Optional Retirement Program for university faculty and administrators.
It was again explicitly adopted to enable the state to attract the best
possible top managers, effectively recognizing once more the problems
with the FRS for workers.
The Proposed Florida Reforms
Budget Committee Chairman Pruitt is
advancing legislation to provide all government workers in the FRS with
the freedom to choose a personal account defined contribution alternative
for their retirement. His comprehensive, well-thought-out plan is supported
by Gov. Jeb Bush (R). If enacted, their plan would make Florida the
leader in the pension liberation movement.
The Pruitt proposal would allow government
workers covered by the FRS a 90-day period during which they could choose
to switch to the personal account defined contribution plan for their
retirement benefits in place of the FRS. In the future, all new employees
would have the chance to choose the new personal account option during
their first 180 days of employment. The proposal offers all workers
a one-time choice during these periods. Once they have made that choice,
they can't switch to either the personal account option or the older
FRS plan later. The state will provide education programs to workers
during these 90-day periods to help them make their choice.
For workers who choose the personal
account plan, their government employers would pay the same as they
do for the FRS plan. The employer would continue to pay the health insurance
subsidy contribution, currently 0.94% of wages, into that system. A
portion of current FRS contributions, about 0.5% of wages, would continue
to be paid into the FRS for disability benefits. The rest, about 9%
of wages, would be paid into the workers' personal accounts to finance
their future retirement benefits.
Workers would make no contributions
to these accounts, whether voluntary or mandatory. Workers would be
able to contribute additional tax-free dollars to retirement on a voluntary
basis through Section 457 deferred-compensation plans offered by their
employers.
Each worker with a personal account
will choose investments for that account from a list approved by the
state government through the State Board of Administration (SBA). The
list will include a diversified mix of mutual funds offering equities
and/or bonds and a range of fixed investments. Workers would exercise
their choice of these investments through a third party administrator
(TPA) for the program, leaving the worker with one simple point of contact.
The TPA would charge no administrative fees, and the worker would bear
only the minimum institutional fees charged by the chosen investment
instrument.
The SBA will also enter into a contract
with an education provider for the system. This provider will conduct
the education programs for employees choosing between the defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. In addition, all educational materials
to be distributed to workers by others to help with this decision would
first be reviewed by this provider, and subject to approval by the SBA
before distribution. For those workers choosing the personal account
program, the provider will conduct continuing educational programs and
review and pre-approve before distribution all marketing materials for
the investment options available to workers.
The defined contribution plan includes
a vesting requirement of only one year. After that time, workers would
have full property rights in the personal account funds and can take
those funds with them to any other job. Past service in the FRS for
current employees counts toward this one-year requirement. The legislation
would also reduce the vesting requirements for the Regular Class in
the defined benefit FRS program to eight years.
Current workers with 8 years of service
who choose the personal account option can transfer to the account the
present value of the accumulated defined benefit obligations they have
earned in the current FRS based on past service. They will basically
receive on a present value basis a proportion of future expected benefits
equivalent to the proportion of expected lifetime contributions that
have been on their behalf. As a result, they will start the new plan
with a considerable sum already deposited in their personal accounts.
Employee contributions and all investment
earnings in the accounts would be tax-free to the worker until benefits
are withdrawn. In retirement, the worker can take the personal account
benefits in the form of an annuity paid through the TPA for the program,
providing a guaranteed monthly income for life. Or the worker can choose
various lump-sum withdrawal options, with only some or none of the funds
devoted to an annuity.
Disability benefits in the defined
contribution plan would be the same as in the current defined benefit
plan. Employers could use the portion of the contribution for these
benefits to self-insure or to purchase private group coverage. Workers
in the personal account defined contribution plan would also receive
the same health insurance subsidy benefits in retirement as those in
the current defined benefit FRS plan.
A survey of Florida government workers
by Watson Wyatt found them about evenly split in preference between
the current defined benefit plan and the new proposed personal account
defined contribution plan. This indicates that about half of current
workers may well move to the new personal account option. As experience
grows with the new personal accounts, preference for them among workers
would likely grow as well. Moreover, much of the support for the current
system came from those in the classes with the richer defined benefits,
such as the Special Risk Class.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
a clear majority of workers supported the idea of allowing them the
choice of the alternative they preferred, whether defined benefit or
defined contribution. That is the essence of the reform offered by Pruitt.
Advantages of the Defined Contribution
Reforms
The personal account defined contribution
reform plan proposed by Pruitt would produce enormous advantages for
the government workers and taxpayers of Florida.
Advantages for Workers
Portability. The clearest advantage
for workers of the defined contribution plan is portability. The funds
would be paid directly into each individual worker's own account. After
the minor one-year vesting period, all contributions to the account
would immediately become the worker's direct property. When a worker
leaves government employment for another job, he or she can then take
this individual retirement account with them. This account would include
all past employer contributions plus full market investment returns.
Consequently, the defined contribution plan provides for full portability.
The current defined benefit FRS plan,
by contrast, has no real portability. When a worker leaves, he or she
cannot take anything with them. For those workers with less than 10
years of service, all past employer contributions and market investment
returns for the worker are left behind in the system, and the worker
gets nothing. Moreover, even those who stay longer than 10 years cannot
take any funds with them. They can only wait to receive the benefits
that the defined benefit plan will later pay them.
This lack of portability is highly
damaging to medium-term as well as shorter-term workers. Shorter-term
here means those working less than about 15-20 years in state employment.
For reasons discussed fully below, the current FRS plan, like defined
benefit plans generally, does not provide good benefits for younger
workers who stay less than 15-20 years or so in service. The system
is skewed to favor the longest-term workers. As a result, not only can
these workers not take anything with them when they leave, they are
not offered good benefits if they just wait to receive what the system
will later pay them. These workers would do much better if they could
just invest the employer contributions through their own personal accounts.
While specific data was not available
for Florida, the same is probably true here as for other states. As
a result of the lack of portability and the plan's benefit structure,
most government workers end up not getting any significant benefits
from a typical defined benefit retirement system. They just end up leaving
before they can vest or qualify for significant benefits. In California,
which has defined benefit plans for their government workers similar
to the FRS, 70% of state and local workers end up not getting any retirement
benefits from the system. In Michigan, 45% of state workers and 65%
of public school employees effectively receive no benefits under the
old defined benefit system.
Vesting. The personal account defined
contribution plan also greatly reduces the vesting requirement to a
minor period of 12 months. In contrast, the current defined benefit
system denies any benefits to all employees working for Florida government
for less than 10 years. Consequently, the personal account defined contribution
plan is highly beneficial for these shorter-term workers. Over half
of current government workers in Florida covered by the FRS have less
than 10 years of service.
Fair Benefits. Under traditional defined
benefit plans, benefits are skewed to favor the longer-term and oldest
workers and disadvantage the younger and shorter-term workers. This
occurs in the FRS as well, in several standard ways.
First, of course, the vesting requirements
eliminate benefits for those working less than 10 years under current
law, with the funds devoted to benefits for those working longer-term.
Secondly, the benefits are a percentage
of average salary, which tends to be much higher for those who have
worked the longest, and for older workers. Take the example of a worker
who enters governmental employment at 22, continues that employment
for 15 years, and then leaves for a private sector job. The final five
years of salary will probably be the highest for the worker's period
of public employment, and will be used to calculate the worker's benefits
at retirement. This will be the salary during the years when the worker
is 33-37. No salary increases for the next 25-30 years of the worker's
career will be counted.
By contrast, suppose another worker
starts employment at 22, continues working for the same government employer
for 40 years, and retires at 62. Suppose as well that both are Regular
Class employees. As compared to the first worker, the second employee's
benefits will naturally equal an additional 1.60% of salary for each
additional year worked past age 37, which fairly gives the worker credit
for the additional years worked. But the 1.60% per year for all years
will be taken against the five years of salary during ages 58-62, which
will include 25 years of additional salary increases. This gives the
second worker more benefits for each year of work than the first worker.
Indeed, compare the first worker to
an older Regular Class worker who also works 15 years for the government.
Assume this older worker starts government employment at age 47, continues
that employment for 15 years, and retires at age 62. That worker will
receive benefits equal to 1.60% of final salary for each of the 15 years
of service, or 24%, times the average salary at ages 58-62. The average
salary at these ages will incorporate an additional 23 years of salary
increases as compared to the average salary at ages 33-37, which is
used to calculate the benefits for the first worker. That worker will
receive 24% times this lower average salary. So the older worker will
receive much higher benefits even though he worked the same number of
years as the younger worker.
Thirdly, granting the same percentage
of final salary for each year worked does not give the full value to
younger workers of the contributions made for them. Consider again our
worker who enters government employment at 22, works for 15 years, and
then leaves for private sector work. The contributions paid into the
system for him during his years of employment continue to earn investment
returns for many years after he leaves government employment. Yet, this
worker will only get the same 1.60% of salary for each of his 15 years
of government employment as other workers. Consequently, the worker
will get no additional benefits for all the years of investment returns
after he leaves employment on the contributions made for him. These
returns will be redistributed to finance the higher benefits of older
and longer-term workers.
Indeed, the contributions for the older
worker who entered government employment at age 47 and retired at 62
only earn returns for 15 years before the worker's retirement, while
the contributions for the younger worker earned returns over a 40 year
period before retirement at age 62. Yet, the older worker receives more
in benefits rather then less, with funds effectively redistributed to
that worker from the younger worker.
Inflation makes the problem even worse.
Salary increases over the years usually incorporate compensation for
inflation. When benefits are calculated based on salary, they will incorporate
the compensation for inflation included in the salary increases over
the worker's career. But for younger, shorter-term workers, this inflation
compensation stops when they leave government employment, as the salary
used for their benefit calculations is fixed at that age. So, for our
15-year worker who leaves for the private sector at age 37, the value
of his salary for retirement benefit calculations will be depreciated
by inflation over the next 25 years, until retirement at age 62. The
value of the worker's benefits will consequently be depreciated by such
inflation as well. By contrast, the longer-term and older workers will
be fully compensated for inflation through their salary increases over
working years.
None of these distortions occur in
the defined contribution plan. The contributions to the worker's account
immediately vest as the property of the worker, so the worker gets to
keep those contributions in any event (assuming he works more than 12
months). Each worker also gets the full market investment returns on
the contributions for every year thereafter, giving him the full value
of those contributions, rather than redistributing some to others based
on a calculated percentage of average salary. Finally, those investment
returns over the years will also include an inflation compensation component;
again giving the worker compensation for inflation for each year after
the contribution is made.
Consequently, the defined contribution
plan gives fair, undistorted benefits to each and every worker. Those
who work longer get proportionally higher benefits to the extent they
worked longer. But they do not get disproportionally higher benefits,
skewed to favor them over other workers, and effectively redistributing
funds from these workers to them.
Personal Control. In the defined contribution
plan, the retirement funds for each worker are under the direct ownership
of the worker in his or her own individual account. Workers can then
pick the private investment manager or vehicle that will best serve
them in the private competitive market, within reasonable limitations
to ensure safety, soundness and integrity. Workers consequently no longer
have to worry about adverse changes in their retirement plan or politicians
failing to make good on their promises, at least for the years already
worked, as the contributions for those years already belong to them
in full.
Better Benefits. Younger and shorter-term
workers who work roughly 20 years or less in government employment would
generally get much better benefits from the personal account, defined
contribution plan, because of all the factors discussed above. However,
even the longest-term workers could get better benefits from the defined
contribution plan as well.
This is shown in the accompanying Table.
The Table assumes that 9% of salary is paid into the defined contribution
system each year for retirement benefits. The retirement contributions
are assumed to be invested and to earn a 5% real rate of return over
the long run. In fact, over the last 75 years, going back before the
Great Depression, the composite real rate of return on all stocks in
the Standard and Poors 500 was 8.0%.(2) The composite
real rate of return on smaller company stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange over this period was even higher, at 9.2%.(3)Over
the long term, the real return paid by investment quality corporate
bonds has been 3-4%.(4) So a 5% real return is
a quite fair assumption allowing for some diversification of stocks
and bonds, and quite ordinary investment performance, with a small proportion
of the returns going to finance the institutional administrative costs
for the personal account investments
Take a worker who enters government
employment at 22, works for 10 years, and then leaves for the private
sector. Assume he earns $25,000 per year after inflation during his
period of government employment. Payments equal to 9% of salary are
paid into his retirement account each year during his government employment,
but all further contributions stop after that. However, the funds continue
to be invested and earn investment returns over the years after government
employment.
By age 62, the worker would retire
with a fund of $128,460 in today's 2000 dollars, after inflation. That
fund would finance an annuity of $13,000 per year for the rest of the
worker's life, compared to benefits of $4,000 per year that would be
paid by the current FRS. In other words, the benefits paid by the defined
contribution personal account would be more than three times as large
as the benefits that would be paid by the current FRS system. The relative
results are the same for workers at $30,000 and $40,000 per year.
A large advantage for the defined contribution
system is similarly maintained if the worker remains in government employment
for 20 years. A worker earning $30,000 each year after inflation would
retire at 62 with about $250,000 in today's dollars. That fund would
finance an annuity of over $25,000 each year for the rest of the worker's
life, compared to $9,600 per year that would be paid by the current
FRS. In other words, the benefits paid by the defined contribution personal
account plan would be over 2-1/2 times the benefits paid by the current
FRS. The relative results are the same for a worker earning $25,000
or $40,000 per year.
A major advantage remains as well for
the defined contribution plan for a worker who continues government
employment for 30 years. A worker earning $30,000 per year would reach
retirement at 62 with over $300,000 in today's 1999 dollars. Such a
fund would finance an annuity of over $31,000 per year for the rest
of the worker's life, compared to $14,400 paid by the current FRS. In
other words, the personal account defined contribution plan would pay
over twice what the current FRS would.
Finally, the defined contribution plan
outperforms the defined benefit plan even for the longest-term workers.
At $30,000 per year in average salary after inflation, after 40 years
of government employment the worker would retire with a fund of about
$340,000 in today's dollars. That fund would finance an annuity of almost
$35,000 per year, compared to $19,200 paid by the current FRS. In other
words, the personal account defined contribution plan would pay 80%
more than the current FRS plan. Similar results again prevail for a
$25,000 or $40,000 worker.
The reasons for the advantage of the
defined contribution plan for the shorter-term workers were discussed
above. But how can the advantage for the longer-term workers as well
be explained? Workers just do not seem to be getting the most for their
money in defined benefit plans. A worker earning just standard market
investment returns, with the help of a major investment firm investing
the account funds, would still get better benefits through the defined
contribution plan. Some of the returns to the defined benefit plans
seem to get siphoned off to benefit the employer or others, and generally
across the country these plans do not maximize returns for workers sufficiently.
Advantages for Taxpayers
No Investment Risk. The most obvious
advantage for taxpayers of the defined contribution plan is that it
eliminates investment risk for them. With the government managing a
common pool of investment funds under a defined benefit plan like the
FRS, the taxpayers bear the complete risk of poor investment performance.
If such poor performance leaves the pool unable to pay the promised
defined benefits, then the taxpayers will have to make up the difference.
Under the defined contribution plan,
however, the taxpayers through the government simply make a specific
contribution to the accounts of the workers each month. The taxpayers
are then not liable for the investment performance.
No Political Risk. Defined contribution
plans greatly reduce another set of risks that are usually overlooked
-- political risks. With the government specifying benefits far in the
future, as under a defined benefit plan like the FRS, there is always
a strong danger of political giveaways by shortsighted politicians.
These politicians can promise higher retirement benefits, while leaving
future officials and taxpayers to pay for them. Under a defined contribution
plan, where the government does not specify future benefits but only
makes regular investment contributions, this risk is eliminated.
Moreover, a large government investment
pool, as under a defined benefit plan, is always subject to the danger
of political interference that could raise costs. Political favoritism
may influence investment policy, prohibiting some investments and forcing
the fund into others. By taking the focus off of simply maximizing investment
returns, such political favoritism will reduce investment returns and
increase the cost of funding the specified defined benefits.
Politicians may seek to raid the large,
tempting investment pool in other ways as well. They may seek to draw
supposedly excess funds out of the pool in one way or another, perhaps
by replacing an over funded plan with a new one, or reducing the government's
contributions. Or they may try to use the funds for short-term added
benefits. Politicians and bureaucrats have been known even to siphon
funds out of these plans improperly or illegally. These actions would
again raise costs for taxpayers.
Government management of the funds
also creates the risk of less than competent handling of the funds by
bureaucrats who lack the incentives, competitive pressures, and expertise
of private investment managers. Attempts to insulate the funds from
political and bureaucratic control by contracting out to private investment
managers may not be entirely successful. The investment managers can
still be subject to political pressure, political mandates in their
contracts, or even counterproductive legislative mandates.
Finally, a large government investment
pool creates the risk for taxpayers of greater government control of
the private economy. Through such a pool, the government may end up
owning large shares of private companies. The government would also
hold a large share of investment capital that it could use to impose
mandates on the private sector.
Even where there has been a good record
of avoiding these abuses in the past, the danger is always present.
However, none of these risks arising from a large government investment
pool exist in a defined contribution plan, where the government does
not maintain such a pool.
No Unfunded Liability. The defined
contribution plan eliminates the danger of any unfunded liability, from
any source, that must be covered by taxpayers. Under a defined benefit
plan like the FRS, any shortfall in the common investment pool that
leaves the pool unable to pay the promised benefits, creating an unfunded
liability, must be covered by the taxpayers, regardless of the cause
of the shortfall. In the defined contribution plan, where the government
does not maintain a common investment pool but only pays a specified
amount to each worker's individual account each month, there is no possibility
of an unfunded liability that taxpayers would have to cover.
Greater Control Over Costs. The defined
contribution plan provides the government and taxpayers greater control
over costs. Costs under a defined benefit plan, where the government
has pledged to provide a certain benefit amount regardless of cost,
can vary greatly, depending on a wide range of factors outside of the
government's control. Retirees can live longer, greatly increasing costs.
More workers may stay with the government employer long-term, increasing
costs. Interest rates or the stock market may decline, requiring increased
contributions to make up the difference.
With the defined contribution plan,
by contrast, the government is responsible only for a specified contribution
each year. This contribution is completely dependent only on what the
government agrees with workers or their union to pay. This means greater
certainty and predictability in budgeting. There is no possibility that
taxpayers will be surprised with a large, unexpected unfunded liability
requiring increased taxes.
Reduced Costs. A defined contribution
plan will also significantly reduce costs. Defined benefit plans have
substantial administrative costs for the government employer. The government
must maintain and pay for the management of the large common pool of
assets. It must also administer the benefits, determining eligibility
and making payments.
With a defined contribution plan, by
contrast, administrative costs for the government employer are negligible.
The government simply pays an amount into each employee's own account
as part of payroll processing. The worker and his investment company
take over administration of the account after that.
Improved Employee Recruitment. Finally,
because of the advantages to employees noted above, defined contribution
plans can help state and local governments attract employees. Highly
talented workers may not be willing to commit to state government employment
long-term. But they may be willing to work for a state or local government
for a few years. The defined contribution plan would make it easier
to recruit such workers because it is fully portable, and the workers
can take the saved contributions with them when they leave one job for
another. Moreover, workers would favor the freedom of choice, personal
control, and possibly higher benefits that they could get through defined
contribution plans. Florida already has recognized these advantages
by adopting narrow defined contribution plans for certain positions
where the competition for highly talented workers is intense.
Criticisms of Defined Contribution
Plans
Unsophisticated Workers
One of the major criticisms of defined
contribution plans is that most workers are too unsophisticated about
investing to handle the responsibility of directing their own retirement
investments. This underestimates the capabilities of working people.
Nevertheless, the reform plan proposed by Pruitt is carefully structured
to avoid this problem. Workers simply pick from a range of sophisticated
investment funds designated and approved by the state government. These
would include major mutual funds and other highly reliable pooled vehicles.
Through these vehicles, highly sophisticated investment managers would
then be picking the individual stocks, bonds and other investments,
not the workers. This model has worked well for workers in a broad range
of contexts, domestically and internationally.
Investment Risk
Probably the main criticism of defined
contribution plans is that they shift investment risk from the employer
to the worker. In a defined benefit plan, the worker receives the specified
benefits regardless of investment performance, so the worker apparently
bears no investment risk. In a defined contribution plan, the worker's
benefits depend entirely on the investment performance of his retirement
account, so the worker bears full investment risk. Poor investment performance
leads directly to lower benefits.
But workers can fully handle the investment
risk posed by defined contribution plans, for several reasons. First,
retirement investments are very long term. The worker is investing not
only for his entire career, but, indeed, for his entire adult life,
as the remaining retirement fund will continue to be invested to support
benefits throughout retirement. With such a long-term investment horizon,
perhaps 60 years or more, workers can weather many ups and downs in
investment performance, with the average return on a diversified portfolio
very likely over the long run to close in on the average long-term market
return.
Secondly, workers can easily invest
in simple, widely available, highly diversified pools of stocks, bonds
and other investments, through mutual funds and other vehicles. Such
diversified pools will track the general market investment returns discussed
above over the long run. Indeed, with a sufficiently broad-based investment
pool, the worker would basically own a piece of the economy as a whole.
If the entire economy collapses, state and local governments will not
be able to support defined benefit plan promises either.
Thirdly, with professional investment
managers handling the specific investments for workers, investment risk
can be minimized in a sophisticated and reliable manner through diversification
and other market strategies.
Workers, indeed, may be able to handle
this investment risk better than state and local governments. For they
can do so without all of the political risks discussed above.
Transition Issues
Another argument is that the transition
to a defined contribution plan will be costly because the government
will have to pay the workers leaving the defined benefit plan their
share of accumulated funds to take to the new plan. But if the defined
benefit plan is fully funded, then it will have the money saved in its
common trust fund to pay the departing workers. If the defined benefit
plan is not fully funded, then it needs to be in any event, and the
government will have to bear that cost anyway.
Moreover, experience shows that those
who leave defined benefit plans to take a defined contribution option
are primarily the shorter-term and younger workers with little in accumulated
funds in the defined benefit plan. As a result, while 63% of the government
workers in West Palm Beach, Florida, chose a newly offered, local, defined
contribution plan, they took with them only 14% of the assets of the
old defined benefit plan. The assets of that plan actually continued
to increase through the transition, climbing from $80.7 million before
the conversion to $86.4 million after the conversion. (5)
Similarly, while 42% of the government workers in Oakland County, Michigan,
chose a new defined contribution plan, they took with them only 13%
of the assets of the old defined benefit plan. That plan's assets continued
to increase throughout the transition as well, climbing from $440.4
million before the conversion to $513.6 million after. (6)
Since the FRS is fully funded, defined
contribution reforms should not create transition problems for the two
plans.
Pension Liberation Across America
States across the country are now starting
to move to new defined contribution retirement plans for their public
employees, in place of the older defined benefit plans, to obtain the
extensive benefits of such reform discussed above. At the forefront
of this reform has been Michigan, which adapted a comprehensive plan
in 1996 proposed by Gov. John Engler (R).
Under that reform, all newly hired
employees enter the defined contribution plan. The state contributes
a minimum of 4% of the worker's salary to an individual investment account
for each worker. The employer will then match voluntary employee contributions
up to an additional 3% of salary, making a total contribution of 10%.
The worker can contribute up to an additional 13% of salary without
employer match at the worker's choice.
The plan includes a vesting feature
added to the traditional defined contribution model. The employer contributions
are vested 50% after two years, 75% after three years, and 100% after
four years. Before such vesting, the employer contribution to a worker's
individual account must be returned if the worker leaves to work for
another employer.
Current employees were able to switch
to the new defined contribution plan only during an "open season"
in the first four months of 1998. For those who made the switch, all
past employee contributions to the defined benefit plan were transferred
to the defined contribution plan. In addition, for workers who were
vested in the defined benefit plan, an amount equal to the present value
of their accumulated retirement benefits was transferred to their defined
contribution account as well. Prior service in the old defined benefit
plan is counted toward the four year vesting requirement of the defined
contribution plan.
Investment options are structured for
workers to make investing easy. First, they can choose from three core
investment funds with set percentages of asset allocations in different
investment areas, reflecting a range of risk and return variations.
State Street Global Advisors, the third party administrator for the
plan and one of the largest pension investment firms in the world, maintains
these three funds, choosing the particular investments and holding to
the preset asset allocation requirements.
Secondly, the worker can choose from
among 12 pre-selected mutual funds considered the best in their primary
investment areas, whether stocks, or bonds, or other private investments.
Finally, the worker can choose a self-directed option, which includes
the choice of hundreds of mutual funds determined to be sound and suitable
for retirement investment.
Workers who leave state employment
under the defined contribution plan can leave their assets in the same
structured investment system, or roll them over into an Individual Retirement
Account or a retirement plan maintained by their next employer.
Current workers who switched to the
defined contribution plan will receive the same retiree health benefits
as under the old defined benefit plan. For new workers in the defined
contribution plan, the state will pay 3% of the cost of the health benefits
for each year of service, up to a maximum of 90%. The retiree pays the
rest. These benefits vest after 10 years of service. Retirees can choose
any alternative private health plan and direct the state premium contribution
towards payment of that plan. This includes private Medical Savings
Account plans.
The state's reform plan made no change
in the benefits of current retirees. Moreover, there was no change in
benefits as well for employees who choose to stay in the old defined
benefit plan.
The state Department of Management
and Budget estimated that Michigan saved almost $100 million in the
first year alone because of the new defined contribution plan, due to
savings on employer contributions and administrative costs. Yet, 45%
of state employees who effectively received no benefits under the old
plan because they left state employment too early will now be able to
benefit under the new system after state employment of only two years,
with fully vested benefits after only four years.
In addition to the state, four major
counties in Michigan have switched to defined contribution plans for
their workers. These include Oakland County, Saginaw County, Washtenaw
County and Wayne County. The state capital, Lansing, has switched as
well, and the city of Kalamazoo has a partial defined contribution plan.
The reform process in California began
with legislation proposed in 1996 by Assemblyman Howard Kaloogian (R-San
Diego). His bill would have authorized, but not required, state and
local employers throughout the state to offer defined contribution plans
as an alternative to their defined benefit plans. The defined benefit
option would have to be maintained as well.
The bill required employers to transfer
accrued benefits from the defined benefit plan to the worker's defined
contribution account, for workers who chose the new plan option. Otherwise,
remaining details of the defined contribution plan, such as employer
and employee contributions, would be left to negotiations between employers
and workers. The bill would allow immediate vesting of all employer
contributions to the defined contribution accounts. It would also allow
a structured investment system as under the Michigan reforms discussed
above.
The bill would expand benefits to 70%
of state workers, who receive no benefits under the state's existing
defined benefit plan because they never satisfy the vesting requirements.
At the same time, because of savings on administration and funding costs,
the state Department of Finance estimated that the bill would save a
whopping $1,642 each year for each new employee who chose the new system.
The bill would affect 1.2 million workers in the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS) and State Teachers Retirement System (STRS)
plans, which hold $165 billion in vested assets.
A limited version of Kaloogian's plan
passed in 1996, providing for new defined contribution options for employees
of the state's colleges and universities. Kaloogian is continuing legislative
efforts to expand this option to all government workers in the states.
His most recent bill would expand the option to all employees of the
state legislature.
Other states with defined contribution
systems for some of their employees include Ohio (university employees),
Illinois (university employees), Washington (public school employees),
Alabama (university employees), West Virginia (public school employees),
South Dakota (university and some other employees), Colorado (public
school employees) and Missouri (university employees). Colorado, Vermont,
Arizona, North Dakota and Montana have enacted a defined contribution
option for limited numbers of government workers in the past few years.
Legislation to provide for such options for more government workers
is pending in Texas, California, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Montana,
South Carolina, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Maine,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma and Arizona, as
well as Florida. About a dozen states also have studies under way to
consider such reform.
Conclusion
Florida should adopt the defined contribution
reform plan proposed by Chairman Pruitt. That plan would offer state
and local government workers the choice of a defined contribution retirement
plan in place of the current FRS defined benefit plan. Such a defined
contribution option offers great advantages for both workers and taxpayers.
In enacting the well-crafted, comprehensive Pruitt proposal, Florida
would be the leader of the national movement for pension liberation.
Table 1: Defined Contribution
Retirement Benefits
Defined Contribution Plan vs.
Defined Benefit Plans: 10 Years of work
|
Annual Salary
|
Total Investment Fund
Accumulated by Retirement
|
Annual Annuity Benefit
|
Replacement Rate
|
Annual Cash Benefit
|
Replacement Rate
|
|
$25,000
|
$128,460
|
$13,093
|
52%
|
$4,000
|
16%
|
|
$30,000
|
$154,152
|
$15,711
|
52%
|
$4,800
|
16%
|
|
$40;000
|
$205,536
|
$20,948
|
52%
|
$6,400
|
16%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Defined Contribution Plan vs.
Defined Benefit Plans: 20 Years of work
|
Annual
Salary
|
Total
Investment Fund Accumulated by Retirement
|
Annual
Annuity Benefit
|
Replacement
Rate
|
Annual
Cash Benefit
|
Replacement
Rate
|
|
$25,000
|
$207,323
|
$21,130
|
85%
|
$8,000
|
32%
|
|
$30,000
|
$248,788
|
$25,357
|
85%
|
$9,600
|
32%
|
|
$40,000
|
$331,717
|
$33,808
|
85%
|
$12,800
|
32%
|
Defined Contribution Plan vs.
Defined Benefit Plans: 30 Years of work
|
Annual
Salary
|
Total
Investment Fund Accumulated by Retirement
|
Annual
Annuity Benefit
|
Replacement
Rate
|
Annual
Cash Benefit
|
Replacement
Rate
|
|
$25,000
|
$255,013
|
$25,990
|
104%
|
$12,000
|
48%
|
|
$30,000
|
$306,016
|
$31,189
|
104%
|
$14,400
|
48%
|
|
$40,000
|
$408,021
|
$41,585
|
104%
|
$19,200
|
48%
|
Defined Contribution Plan
vs. Defined Benefit Plans: 40 Years of work
|
Annual
Salary
|
Total
Investment Fund Accumulated by Retirement
|
Annual
Annuity Benefit
|
Replacement
Rate
|
Annual
Cash Benefit
|
Replacement
Rate
|
|
$25,000
|
$284,736
|
$29,020
|
116%
|
$16,000
|
64%
|
|
$30,000
|
$341,683
|
$34,824
|
116%
|
$19,200
|
64%
|
|
$40,000
|
$455,578
|
$46,432
|
116%
|
$25,600
|
64%
|
Footnotes
Note: All figures are in constant
2000 dollars and assume a 5% real rate of return on investment. The
worker is assumed to enter public employment at 22 and retire at age
62. The defined benefit plan column states the retirement benefits
that would be paid under the current FRS.
-
The information in this section
comes from Florida Retirement System, Annual Report, July 1, 1997
- June 30, 1998, Division of Retirement, State of Florida, May 1999;
Florida Retirement System, A Retirement Guide for the Regular Class,
Division of Retirement, State of Florida, 1999 Edition.
-
Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation,
1999 Yearbook, (Chicago, Ill., Ibbotson Associates Inc., 1999)
-
Ibid.
-
Calculated from Moody's Investor
Services, Industrial Manual, Bond Survey
-
Peter J. Ferrara, Pension Liberation,
American Legislative Exchange Council, State Factor, 1996
-
Ibid.
|