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POLICY BRIEF FROM AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM
Pension
Liberation for Arizona
By Peter J. Ferrara
In this Policy Brief:
Introduction
Over the past 20 years, the private
sector has shifted dramatically towards "defined contribution"
pension programs, where the employer pays a specified amount into an
investment account for the worker and these funds plus accumulated returns
over the years finance retirement benefits. The number of private sector
employees in such plans soared from 11 million in 1975 to 43 million
in 1995, an increase of about 300%. Contrast that with the stagnation
of private defined benefit plans, where the employer promises a specified
retirement benefit and saves and invests the funds in a common investment
pool to finance those benefits. From 1975 to 1995, the number of private
sector employees in such plans grew by less than 10%, from 33 million
to 36 million. The majority of private sector employees with pensions
are in fact now in defined contribution plans.
A trend is now developing among the
states to begin to shift public employee pensions towards defined contribution
plans as well. Michigan adopted a comprehensive defined contribution
system for state workers in 1996. California began adopting such a plan
for some of its workers that year as well, and the reform process there
continues. Ten states have now adopted defined contribution reforms
for a portion of their workers. Legislation for such reform is now pending
in six states, including Arizona, and formal legislative studies for
such reforms are under way in 12 other states.
Arizona's public employee pension system
has been well run. But reform providing for defined contribution retirement
plans would provide important benefits for both workers and taxpayers.
The current system lacks portability for workers, while a defined contribution
plan would provide full and immediate portability. For taxpayers, while
the current system is fully funded, a defined contribution system avoids
any dangers of unfunded liabilities arising in the future. Moreover,
the defined contribution plan reduces administrative costs for the state,
as it then merely pays a specified portion of salary into a worker's
account each month, and no longer has to administer plan benefits or
a large, centralized pool of investments to finance those benefits.
Both taxpayers and workers also consequently avoid the political risks
of administration of such a large investment pool in the public sector,
where the funds can be mishandled, subject to political giveaways, exposed
to counterproductive political favoritism in investment, and other risks.
While these may not have been problems in Arizona in the past, they
can be in the future.
Basically, the defined contribution
plan privatizes the investment function of the public employee pension
system, producing these and other benefits.
The Arizona Public Employee Retirement
System
The Arizona retirement system for public
employees actually includes four plans. Almost 90% of state workers
are in the Arizona State Retirement System (ASRS). Law enforcement officers,
firefighters and others are in the Public Safety Personnel Retirement
System. Correction officers are in the Correction Officers Retirement
Plan. State and county elected officials and judges are in the Elected
Officials Retirement Plan.
All of these plans are similar, traditional
defined benefit plans. Because the great majority of workers are in
the ASRS, that plan will be described in more detail later.
Under ASRS, workers can retire when
their age plus years of service totals 80. So, for example, a worker
can retire at 55 with 25 years of service. Workers can retire in any
event at age 65, or at 62 with 10 years of service.
Retirement benefit are equal to 2%
times years of service times average earnings during the last three
years of service. So a worker who retires at 55 with 25 years of service
would receive benefits equal to 50% of pre-retirement income. Some inflation
adjustments are payable, depending on years of service up to 3%, if
investment earnings for the year exceed 9%. The retiree may choose survivors
benefit options as well, which may reduce retirement benefits.
The right to these benefits vests after
five years. Workers who leave before then receive back only their own
contributions plus fixed interest, and lose all employer contributions
and investment returns. Even after five years, workers who leave state
employment cannot take their employer contributions and investment returns
with them. They can only take out their own contributions plus fixed
interest, and forego all future benefits under the system. Or they can
wait until retirement and receive whatever retirement benefits they
are entitled to given their years of service.
The system is financed by equal contributions
from the employer and employee set each year at the level actuarially
necessary to maintain full funding of benefits. Current contribution
rates are about 3% of earnings from the employer and each employee,
for a total of 6% of earnings for each worker. This reflects the strong
performance of the stock market in recent years. In times of more average
or even below average returns, the contribution rate would climb, perhaps
much higher. Another 0.5% of wages from employer and each employee,
for a total of 1% per worker, are assessed for disability benefits.
The ASRS is totally funded, with assets
equal to about 114% of accrued benefits.
Pension Liberation Across America
States across the country are now starting
to move to new defined contribution retirement plans for their public
employees, in place of the older defined benefit plans. The leader was
Michigan, which adapted a comprehensive plan in 1996 proposed by Governor
John Engler.
Under that reform, current state employees
can choose the new defined contribution plan or stay in the old defined
benefit plan. All newly hired employees will be in the defined contribution
plan. The reform originally committed to including all public school
employees in the reform. But since the old defined benefit plan was
not fully funded, this has been delayed to avoid transition funding
problems.
Under the defined contribution plan,
the state contributes a minimum of 4% of the worker's salary to an individual
investment account for each worker. The employer will then match voluntary
employee contributions up to an additional 3% of salary, making a total
contribution of 10%. The worker can contribute up to an additional 13%
of salary without employer match at the worker's choice.
The plan includes a vesting feature
added to the traditional defined contribution model. The employer contributions
are vested 50% after 2 years, 75% after 3 years, and 100% after four
years. Before such vesting, the employer contribution to a worker's
individual account must be returned if the worker leaves to work for
another employer.
Current employees could choose to switch
to the new defined contribution plan only during an open season in the
first four months of 1998. For those that make the switch, all past
employee contributions to the defined benefit plan are transferred to
the defined contribution plan. In addition, for workers who are vested
in the defined benefit plan, an amount equal to the present value of
their accumulated retirement benefits is transferred to their defined
contribution account as well. Once a worker switches to the defined
contribution plan, he cannot later choose to go back to the defined
benefit plan. On the other hand, after the four month window in early
1998, workers in the defined benefit plan can no longer choose to switch
to the defined contribution plan. For current workers who do switch,
their prior service in the old defined benefit plan is counted toward
the 4 year vesting requirement of the defined contribution plan.
Investment options are structured for
workers to make investing easy for them. First, they can choose from
three core investment funds with set percentages of asset allocations
in different investment areas, reflecting a range of risk and return
variations. State Street Global Advisors, the third party administrator
for the plan and one of the largest pension investment firms in the
world, will maintain these three funds, choosing the particular investments
and holding to the preset asset allocation requirements.
Secondly, the worker can choose from
among 12 pre-selected mutual funds considered the best in their primary
investment areas, whether stocks, or bonds, or other private investments.
Finally, the worker can choose a self-directed option which includes
the choice of hundreds of mutual funds determined to be sound and suitable
for retirement investment.
Workers who leave state employment
under the defined contribution plan can leave their assets in the same
structured investment system, or roll them over into an Individual Retirement
Account or a retirement plan maintained by their next employer.
Current workers who switch to the defined
contribution plan will receive the same retiree health benefits as under
the old defined benefit plan. For new workers in the defined contribution
plan, the state will pay 3% of the cost of the health benefits for each
year of service, up to a maximum of 90%. The retiree pays the rest.
These benefits vest after 10 years of service. Retirees can choose any
alternative private health plan and direct the state premium contribution
towards payment of that plan. This includes private Medical Savings
Account plans.
The state's reform plan provides for
no change in the benefits of current retirees. Moreover, there will
be no change in benefits as well for employees who choose to stay in
the old defined benefit plan.
The state Department of Management
and Budget estimates that Michigan will save almost $100 million in
the first year alone because of the new defined contribution plan. Yet,
45% of state employees who effectively received no benefits under the
old plan because they left state employment too early will now be able
to benefit under the new system after state employment of only 2 years,
with fully vested benefits after only 4 years.
In addition to the state, four major
counties in Michigan have switched to defined contribution plans for
their workers. These include Oakland County, Saginaw County, Washtenaw
County, and Wayne County. The state capitol, Lansing, has switched as
well, and the city of Kalamazoo has a partial defined contribution plan.
The reform process in California began
with legislation proposed in 1996 by Assemblyman Howard Kaloogian (R-San
Diego). His bill would have authorized but not required state and local
employers throughout the state to offer defined contribution plans as
an alternative to their defined benefit plans. The defined benefit option
would have to be maintained as well. Non-school employers could choose
to have the defined contribution plan administered by the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and school employers could
choose the State Teacher's Retirement System (STRS). Alternatively,
the employer could choose any qualified private company, or could administer
the plan itself.
The bill required employers to transfer
accrued benefits from the defined benefit plan to the worker's defined
contribution account, for workers who chose the new plan option. Otherwise,
remaining details of the defined contribution plan, such as employer
and employee contributions, would be left to negotiations between employers
and workers. The bill in particular allows immediate vesting of all
employer contributions to the defined contribution accounts. It would
also allow a structured investment system as under the Michigan reforms
discussed above.
The bill would expand benefits to 70%
of state workers, who receive no benefits under the state's existing
defined benefit plan because they never satisfy the vesting requirements.
At the same time, because of savings on administration and funding costs,
the state Department of Finance estimated that the bill would save a
whopping $1,642 each year for each new employee who chose the new system.
The bill would affect 1.2 million workers in the CalPERS and STRS plans,
which hold $165 billion in vested assets.
A limited version of Kaloogians's plan
passed in 1996, providing for new defined contribution options for employees
of the state's colleges and universities. Kaloogian is continuing legislative
efforts to expand this option to all government workers in the states.
His most recent bill would expand the option to all employees of the
state legislature.
Other states with defined contribution
systems for some of their employees includes Ohio (university employees),
Illinois (university employees), Washington (public school employees),
Alabama (university employees), West Virginia (public school employees),
South Dakota (university and some other employees), Colorado (public
school employees) and Missouri (university employees). Legislation to
provide for such plans for more government workers is pending in California,
Colorado, South Dakota, Florida, and Oklahoma, as well as Arizona. Twelve
states also have formal legislative studies under way to consider such
reform--Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
A Defined Contribution Plan for
Arizona
Arizona should offer its workers an
alternative defined contribution retirement plan as well. This plan
can be structured as follows.
Workers and employers would each pay
the same amount into this defined contribution retirement plan that
they pay for the current retirement system. This is presently about
3.5% of wages each for employer and employee counting the disability
benefits. Workers can be allowed to voluntarily contribute additional
amounts, up to a total of 10% of their wages counting the employer contributions,
or any higher limit allowed by federal tax law. Under the current defined
benefit plan, the required contribution can rise as necessary to finance
the promised benefits depending on investment performance. The employer
would be required to pay any such increased amounts for the current
defined benefit plan into the defined contribution plan. But the worker
would be left free to decide whether to match those required contributions.
All contributions to the defined contribution
plan would go into an individual investment account for each worker.
These contributions would immediately become the private property of
each worker with no vesting period. The worker would then choose an
investment company to manage his or her account and pick the particular
investments for the account. The workers could choose from a wide range
of different companies approved by the state. Companies that wanted
to manage such funds would apply to the state for approval. The state
would approve only reliable firms with established expertise, which
would commit to comply with the state's rules and regulations. Such
companies would include major stock brokerage firms, banks, insurance
companies, mutual funds and others. Workers could switch among these
investment companies during an open season each year.
The investment companies would then
determine what particular stocks, bonds and other investments to buy
with the funds in each worker's account. Highly risky and speculative
investments would be prohibited. But the funds could be invested in
domestic and foreign stocks and bonds, government securities, perhaps
certain real estate vehicles, and other instruments. The Federal regulations
currently applying to investments in Individual Retirement Accounts
and 401(k) plans would be a good model to follow.
Investment returns to the accounts
would be tax free over the years. Some of the contributed funds would
be set aside to buy private life and disability insurance matching the
survivors and disability benefits of the current defined benefit system.
The investment company chosen by the worker would be responsible for
obtaining such insurance. No withdrawals from the defined contribution
investment account would be allowed before retirement.
The worker could retire at any age
at which retirement is permissible under the current defined benefit
system. Retirement benefits would equal what the funds accumulated in
each worker's retirement account could support. Workers could choose
to buy a private annuity with some or all of the funds, which would
guarantee specified benefits for the rest of the worker's life. Or the
worker could rely on periodic withdrawals from the accounts, which would
be limited to ensure that workers would not run out of funds before
a reasonable life expectancy.
Workers in the work force today who
have already paid into the current defined benefit plan by any number
of years would be free to choose to switch to this new defined contribution
plan. They would each receive a lump sum payment from the current defined
benefit plan into their new defined contribution retirement accounts.
This payment would be equal to their share of the assets in the current
defined benefit plan which had been set aside to finance their accrued
retirement benefits. This should compensate them sufficiently for both
the employer and employee contributions paid into the system over the
years for them.
The new defined contribution plan would
only be an option for all current and future government workers in the
state covered by any of the current defined benefit plans. They would
each be free to choose it or to choose to stay in the current defined
benefit plan if they desire. Workers still in the defined benefit plan
would continue to be free to choose the new defined contribution alternative
during an open season each year.
Advantages of Defined Contribution
Reforms
Such a defined contribution reform
plan would produce enormous advantages for the state workers and taxpayers
of Arizona.
Advantages for Workers
Portability. The clearest advantage for workers of the defined contribution
plan is portability. The funds would be paid directly into each individual
worker's own account and immediately become the worker's direct property.
When a worker leaves state employment for another job, he or she can
then take this individual retirement account with them. This account
would include all past employer and employee contribution plus full
market investment returns. Consequently, the defined contribution plan
provides for full portability..
The current defined benefit ASRS plan,
by contrast, has no real portability. When a worker leaves, he or she
can take with them only their own past contributions plus fixed interest.
They must give up the employer contributions for all of their years
of work, all investment returns on those contributions, and the full
market investment returns on their own contribution in excess of the
fixed interest they can withdraw.
This lack of portability is highly
damaging to shorter term and younger workers. And shorter term here
means those working less than about 15 years in state employment. For
reasons discussed fully below, the ASRS, like defined benefit plans
generally, does not provide good benefits for younger workers who stay
less than 15 years or so in service. The system is skewed to favor the
longest term workers. As a result, the shorter term workers cannot take
anything but their own money with them when they leave, and they are
not offered good benefits if they just wait to receive what the system
will later pay them. These workers can frankly do much better by just
taking their own money out and investing it, rather than waiting for
these future benefits from the system.
While specific data was not available
for Arizona, the same is probably true here as for other states. As
a result of the lack of portability and the plan's benefit structure,
most state workers end up not getting any significant benefits from
a typical defined benefit retirement system. They just end up leaving
with their own money back. In California, which has defined benefit
plans for their government workers similar to the ASRS, 70% of state
and local workers end up not getting any retirement benefits from the
system. In Michigan, 45% of state workers and 65% of public school employees
effectively received no benefits under the old defined benefit plan.
The defined contribution plan solves
these problems with full and immediate portability. Under this plan,
100% of workers would get retirement benefits for the years they worked
for state or local government. And they would take those benefits with
them wherever they go. This would be highly beneficial for younger and
shorter term workers who stay in public employment roughly 15 years
or less, which probably constitutes the majority of people who work
for state or local government for at least part of their lives.
Vesting. The defined contribution plan
also eliminates any vesting requirement. The funds paid into the worker's
account immediately become the property of the worker and remain fully
available to pay future retirement benefits. This includes the employer
as well as employee contributions and all investment returns on those
contributions. Under the current defined benefit system, by contrast,
the 5 year vesting requirement eliminates any real benefit for workers
who stay less than 5 years.
The defined contribution plan is consequently
highly beneficial for these shortest term workers. A vesting requirement
can be imposed on a defined contribution plan, as in Michigan, allowing
workers to take permanent control of the funds in their own accounts
only after the vesting period. But there is really no good reason for
such a requirement in the defined contribution context. A vesting requirement
in a defined benefit plan makes sense to eliminate small and relatively
inconsequential benefit payments to numerous short term employees, and
the burden of keeping track of the financing and payment of such benefits.
But in a defined contribution plan, the government simply pays a proportion
of the worker's salary into the worker's own account and leaves it to
the worker after that. Eliminating any vesting requirement here would
allow all workers to receive retirement contributions for the years
they worked for the government employer, without any significant administrative
burden on the system.
Fair Benefits. Under traditional defined
benefit plans, benefits are skewed to favor the longer term and oldest
workers and disadvantage the younger and shorter term workers. This
occurs in the ASRS as well, in several standard ways.
First, of course, the vesting requirements
eliminate benefits for those working less than 5 years, with the funds
devoted to benefits for those working longer term.
Secondly, the benefits are a percentage
of final salary, which tends to be much higher for those have worked
the longest, and for older workers. Take the example of a worker who
enters governmental employment at 22, continues that employment for
15 years, and then leaves for a private sector job. The final three
years of salary used to calculate the worker's benefits at retirement
will be the years when the worker was 35-37. No salary increases for
the next 25-30 years of the worker's career will be counted. By contrast,
suppose another worker starts employment at 22, continues working for
the same government employer for 40 years, and retires at 62. As compared
to the first worker, this worker's benefits will naturally equal an
additional 2% of salary for each additional year worked past age 37,
which fairly gives the worker credit for the additional years worked.
But this additional 2% per year will be taken against the final salary
at age 62, which will include 25 years of additional salary increases.
This gives the second worker more benefits for each year of work than
the first worker.
Indeed, compare the first worker to
an older worker who also works 15 years for the government employer.
Assume this older worker starts government employment at age 47, continues
that employment for 15 years, and retires at age 62. That worker will
receive benefits equal to 2% for each of the 15 years of service, or
30%, times the average salary at ages 60-62. The average salary at these
ages will incorporate an additional 25 years of salary increases as
compared to the salary at ages 35-37 which is used to calculate the
benefits of the first worker, who will receive 30% times this lower
average salary. So the older worker will receive much higher benefits
even though he or she worked the same number of years as the younger
worker.
Thirdly, granting the same percentage
of final salary for each year worked, 2%, does not give the full value
to younger workers of the contributions made for them. Consider again
our worker who enters government employment at 22, works for 15 years,
and then leaves for private sector work. The contributions paid into
the system for him during his years of employment, including his own
contributions, continue to earn investment returns for many years after
he leaves government employment. Yet, this worker will only get the
same 2% of final salary for each of his 15 years of government employment
as other workers. Consequently, the worker will get nothing for all
the years of investment returns on his contributions after he leaves
employment. These returns will be redistributed to finance the higher
benefits of older and longer term workers. Indeed, the contributions
for the older worker who entered government employment at age 47 and
retired at 62 only earn returns for 15 years before the worker's retirement,
while the contributions for the younger worker earned returns over a
40 year period before retirement at age 62. Yet, the older worker receives
more in benefits rather then less, with funds effectively redistributed
to that worker from the younger worker.
Inflation makes the problem even worse. Salary increases over the years
usually incorporate compensation for inflation. When benefits are calculated
based on salary, they will incorporate the compensation for inflation
included in the salary increases over the worker's career. But for younger,
shorter term workers, this inflation compensation stops when they leave
government employment, as the salary used for their benefit calculations
is fixed at that age. So, for our 15 year worker who leaves for the
private sector at age 37, the value of his salary for retirement benefit
calculations will be depreciated by inflation over the next 25 years,
until retirement at age 62. The value of the worker's benefits will
consequently be depreciated by such inflation as well. By contrast,
the longer term and older workers will be fully compensated for inflation
through their salary increases over working years.
None of these distortions occur in
the defined contribution plan. The contributions to the worker's account
immediately vest as the property of the worker, so the worker gets to
keep those contributions in any event. Each worker also gets the full
market investment returns on the contributions for every year thereafter,
giving him the full value of those contributions, rather than redistributing
some to others based on a calculated percentage of final salary. Finally,
those investment returns over the years will also include an inflation
compensation component, again giving the worker compensation for inflation
for each year after the contribution is made.
Consequently, the defined contribution
plan gives fair, undistorted benefits to each and every worker. Those
who work longer get proportionally higher benefits to the extent they
worked longer. But they do not get disproportionally higher benefits,
skewed to favor them over other workers, and effectively redistributing
funds from these workers to them.
Personal Control. In the defined contribution
plan, the retirement funds for each worker are under the direct ownership
of the worker in his or her own individual account. Workers can then
pick the private investment manager that will best serve them in the
private competitive market. They consequently no longer have to worry
about adverse changes in their retirement plan or politicians failing
to make good on their promises, at least for the years already worked,
as the contributions for those years already belong to them in full.
Better Benefits. Younger and shorter
term workers who work roughly 20 years or less in government employment
would generally get much better benefits from the defined contribution
plan, because of the all the factors discussed above. Suprisingly, however,
even the longest term workers would likely get better benefits form
the defined contribution plan as well.
This is shown in the accompanying Table.
The table assumes a 5.5% real rate of return earned on retirement investments
over the long run. In fact, over the 70 year period from 1926 to 1996,
the composite real rate of return on all stocks in the Standard and
Poors 500 was 7.5%.1 The composite real rate of
return on smaller company stocks on the New York Stock Exchange over
this period was even higher, at 9.5%.2 A diversified
portfolio of 75% large stocks and 25% small stocks would have earned
a real return of 8%. Over the long term, the real return paid by investment
quality corporate bonds has been 3-4%.3 So a 5.5%
real return is a quite fair assumption allowing for some diversification
of stocks and bonds, reasonable administrative costs (which should be
less than 50 basis points), and quite ordinary investment performance.
Take the example of a worker who earns
$30,000 per year over his career after inflation. The table assumes
that the same 6% of salary is paid into the defined contribution plan
each year as paid currently into the ASRS. After 40 years of work, this
worker would retire with a fund of about $250,000 in today's dollars.
Assuming retirement at the normal Social Security retirement age, that
fund would finance an annuity paying the worker almost $35,000 per year
each year for the rest of his life, or about 116% of preretirement income.
The ASRS would pay the worker 80% of final salary, or $24,000 per year.
So the defined contribution plan would actually pay the worker about
45% more. For those who work for 30 instead of 40 years, the table shows
that for those who retire at the normal Social Security age the defined
contribution plan would still pay slightly more than the ASRS defined
benefit plan. This would apply to a worker who started employment in
his mid 30s and retired in his mid 60s. But under ASRS those who start
covered employment in their early 20s can retire after 30 years and
receive the benefits shown starting in their early 50s. This is a substantial
advantage of the ASRS plan for these workers.
However, this comparison is based on
the current 6% contribution rate that is due to the recent fabulous
stock market performance. When that performance returns to the normal
long term levels reflected in the assumption of a 5.5% real return on
investment in the table, this contribution rate will have to increase
substantially. Such a higher contribution rate paid into the defined
contribution plan would allow earlier retirement for these 30 year workers
closer to the ASRS. Moreover, the advantages of the ASRS for these workers
is based on a redistribution from other workers in the system, primarily
younger and shorter term workers, which is unfair.
Advantage for Taxpayers
No Investment Risk. The most obvious
advantage for taxpayers of the defined contribution plan is that it
eliminates investment risk for them. With the government managing a
common pool of investment funds under a defined benefit plan like the
ASRS, the taxpayers bear the complete risk of poor investment performance.
If such poor performance leaves the pool unable to pay the promised
defined benefits, then the taxpayers will have to make up the difference.
Under the defined contribution plan,
however, the taxpayers simply make a specific contribution to the accounts
of the workers each month. The government is then not liable for the
investment performance.
No Political Risk. Defined contribution
plans greatly reduce another set of risks that are usually overlooked-
political risks. With the government specifying benefits far in the
future, as under a defined benefit plan like the ASRS, there is always
a strong danger of political giveaways by short-sighted politicians.
These politicians can promise higher retirement benefits, while leaving
future officials and taxpayers to pay for them. Under a defined contribution
plan, where the government does not specify future benefits but only
makes regular investment contributions, this risk is eliminated.
Moreover, a large government investment
pool, as under a defined benefit plan, is always subject to the danger
of political interference that could raise costs. Political favortism
may influence investment policy, prohibiting some investments and forcing
the fund into others. By taking the focus off of simply maximizing investment
returns, such political favoritism will reduce investment returns and
increase the cost of funding the specified defined benefits.
Politicians may seek to raid the large,
tempting investment pool in other ways as well. They may seek to draw
supposedly excess funds out of the pool in one way or another, perhaps
by replacing an overfunded plan with a new one, or reducing the government's
contributions. Or they may try to use the funds for short-term added
benefits. Politicians and bureaucrats have been known even to siphon
funds out of these plans improperly or illegally. These actions would
again raise costs for taxpayers.
Government management of the funds
also creates the risk of mishandling the funds by
bureaucrats who lack the incentives,
competitive pressures, and expertise of private investment managers.
Attempts to insulate the funds from bureaucratic control by contracting
out to private investment managers may not be entirely successful.
Finally, a large government investment
pool creates the risk for taxpayers of greater government control of
the private economy. Through such a pool, the government may end up
owning large shares of private companies. The government would also
hold a large share of investment capital that it could use to impose
mandates on the private sector.
Even where there has been a good record
of avoiding these abuses in the past, as in Arizona, the danger is always
present. However, none of these risks arising from a large government
investment pool exist in a defined contribution plan, where the government
does not maintain such a pool.
No Unfunded Liability. The defined
contribution plan eliminates the danger of any unfunded liability, from
any source, that must be covered by taxpayers. Under a defined benefit
plan, like the
ASRS, any shortfall in the common investment
pool that leaves the pool unable to pay the promised benefits, creating
an unfunded liability, must be covered by the taxpayers, regardless
of the cause of
the shortfall. In the defined contribution
plan, where the government does not maintain a common investment pool
but only pays a specified amount to each worker's individual account
each month, with these funds financing each worker's future benefits,
there is no possibility of an unfunded liability that taxpayers would
have to cover.
Greater Control Over Costs. The defined
contribution plan provides the government and taxpayers greater control
over costs. Costs under a defined benefit plan, where the government
has pledged to provide a certain benefit amount regardless of cost,
can vary greatly, depending on a wide range of factors outside the government's
control. Retirees can live longer, greatly increasing costs. More workers
may stay with the government employer long term, increasing costs. Interest
rates or the stock market may decline, requiring increased contributions
to make up the difference.
With the defined contribution plan,
by contrast, the government is responsible only for a specified contribution
each year. This contribution is completely dependent only on what the
government agrees with workers or their union to pay. This means in
turn greater certainty and predictability in budgeting. There is no
possibility that taxpayers will be surprised with a large, unexpected
unfunded liability that will require increased taxes.
Reduced Costs. A defined contribution
plan will also significantly reduce costs. Defined benefit plans have
large administrative costs for the government employer. The government
must maintain and pay for the management of the large common pool of
assets. It must also administer the benefits, determining eligibility
and making payments.
With a defined contribution plan, by
contrast, administrative costs for the government employer are negligible.
The government simply pays an amount into each employee's own account
as part of payroll processing. The worker takes over administration
of the account after that.
In California, the state Department
of Finance estimated that the defined contribution plan offered by Assemblyman
Howard Kaloogian would save the state's taxpayers $1,642 per employee
each year. Because the ASRS seems to be much better run than the California
system, immediate cost savings from a defined contribution reform here
would probably not be nearly as great, but would still probably be significant.
Criticisms of Defined Contribution
Plans
Unsophisticated Workers
One of the major criticisms of defined
contribution plans is that most workers are too unsophisticated about
investing to handle the responsibility of directing their own retirement
investments. This underestimates the capabilities of working people.
Nevertheless, the plan proposed above was carefully structured to avoid
this problem. Under that plan, workers would simply pick from a wide
range of sophisticated, highly reliable, investment management companies.
These would include large banks, insurance companies, stock brokerage
firms, and others. These highly sophisticated investment managers would
then be picking the individual stocks, bonds and other investments,
not the workers.
Investment Risk
Probably the main criticism of defined
contribution plans is that they shift investment risk from the employer
to the worker. In a defined benefit plan, the worker receives the specified
benefits regardless of investment performance, so the worker bears no
investment risk. In a defined contribution plan, the worker's benefits
depend entirely on the investment performance of his retirement account,
so the worker bears full investment risk. Poor investment performance
leads directly to lower benefits.
What is not widely recognized is that
while defined contribution plans leave workers subject to investment
risk, defined benefit plans without inflation adjustments leave workers
subject to inflation risk. As inflation rises, the specified benefit
in an unadjusted defined benefit plan is worth less and less. Under
a defined contribution plan, by contrast, the worker's investments would
rise along with inflation over the long run, providing a real, above
inflation, market rate of return. This would tend to keep prospective
long run benefits rising with inflation.
Also not sufficiently appreciated is
that workers can fully handle the investment risk posed by defined contribution
plans, for several reasons. First, retirement investments are very long
term. The worker is investing not only for his entire career, but, indeed,
for his entire life, as the remaining retirement fund will continue
to be invested to support benefits throughout retirement. With such
a long term investment horizon, perhaps 60 years or more, workers can
weather many ups and downs in investment performance, with the average
return on a diversified portfolio very likely over the long run to close
in on the average long term market return.
Secondly, workers can easily invest
in simple, widely available, highly diversified pools of stocks, bonds
and other investments, through mutual funds and other vehicles. Such
diversified pools will track the general market investment returns discussed
above over the long run. Indeed, with a sufficiently broad based investment
pool, the worker would basically own a piece of the economy as a whole.
If the entire economy collapses, state and local governments will not
be able to support defined benefit plan promises either.
Thirdly, with professional investment
managers handling the specific investments for workers, investment risk
can be minimized in a sophisticated and reliable manner through diversification
and other market strategies.
Workers, indeed, may be able to handle
this investment risk better than state and local governments. For they
can do so without all of the political risks discussed above.
Transition Issues
Another argument is that the transition
to a defined contribution plan will be costly because the government
will have to pay the workers leaving the defined benefit plan their
share of accumulated funds to take to the new plan. But if the defined
benefit plan is fully funded, like the ASRS and the other current Arizona
plans, then it will have the money to pay the departing workers saved
in its common trust fund. If the defined benefit plan is not fully funded,
then it needs to be in any event, and the government will have to bear
that cost anyway.
Moreover, experience shows that those
who leave defined benefit plans to take a defined contribution option
are primarily the shorter term and younger workers with little in accumulated
funds in the defined benefit plan. As a result, while 63% of the government
workers in West Palm Beach, Florida chose the newly offered defined
contribution plan, they took with them only 14% of the assets of the
old defined benefit plan. The assets of that plan actually continued
to increase through the transition, climbing from $80.7 million before
the conversion to $86.4 million after the conversion.4
Similarly, while 42% of the government workers in Oakland County, Michigan
chose the new defined contribution plan, they took with them only 13%
of the assets of the old defined benefit plan. That plan's assets continued
to increase throughout the transition as well, climbing from $440.4
million before the conversion to $513.6 million after.5
Conclusion
Arizona should adopt the defined contribution
reform plan advanced in this study. That plan would offer state and
local government workers the choice of a defined contribution retirement
plan in place of their current defined benefit plans. This new plan
offers great advantages for both workers and taxpayers.
Defined
Contribution Retirement Benefits
Assumes 5.5% Real Return on Investments,
(figures in 1998 dollars)
Defined Contribution Plan vs.
Defined Benefit Plan: 40 Years of
work
| Annual Salary |
Total Investment Fund Accumulated
by Retirement |
Annual Annuity Benefit |
Replacement Rate |
Annual Benefit |
Replacement Rate |
| $30,000 |
$481,220 |
$67,090 |
224% |
$18,000 -$24,000 |
60% - 80% |
| $40,000 |
$641,627 |
$89,577 |
224% |
$24,000 - $32,000 |
60% - 80% |
| $50,000 |
$802,033 |
$113,017 |
226% |
$30,000 - $40,000 |
60% - 80% |
Defined Contribution Plan
vs. Defined Benefit Plan: 30 Years
of work
|
Annual Salary
|
Total Investment Fund Accumulated
by Retirement
|
Annual Annuity Benefit
|
Replacement Rate
|
Annual Benefit
|
Replacement Rate
|
|
$30,000
|
$435,864
|
$60,766
|
203%
|
$13,500 - $18,000
|
45% - 60%
|
|
$40,000
|
$581,152
|
$81,134
|
203%
|
$18,000 - $24,000
|
45% - 60%
|
|
$50,000
|
$726,440
|
$102,364
|
205%
|
$22,500 - $30,000
|
45% - 60%
|
Defined Contribution Plan
vs. Defined Benefit Plan: 20 Years
of work
| Annual Salary |
Total Investment Fund Accumulated
by Retirement |
Annual Annuity Benefit |
Replacement Rate |
Annual Benefit |
Replacement Rate |
| $30,000 |
$358,386 |
$49,965 |
167% |
$9,000- $12,000 |
30% - 40% |
| $40,000 |
$477,848 |
$66,713 |
167% |
$12,000- $16,000 |
30% - 40% |
| $50,000 |
$597,310 |
$84,168 |
168% |
$15,000- $20,000 |
30% - 40% |
Defined Contribution Plan
vs. Defined Benefit Plan: 10
Years of work
|
Annual Salary
|
Total Investment Fund Accumulated
by Retirement
|
Annual Annuity Benefit
|
Replacement Rate
|
Annual Benefit
|
Replacement Rate
|
|
$30,000
|
$226,051
|
$31,515
|
105%
|
$4,500 - $6,000
|
15% - 20%
|
|
$40,000
|
$301,401
|
$42,079
|
105%
|
$6,000 - $8,000
|
15% - 20%
|
|
$50,000
|
$376,752
|
$53,089
|
106%
|
$7,500 - $10,000
|
15% - 20%
|
Footnotes
1. Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation,
1997 Yearbook, (Chicago, Ill., Ibbotson Associates, Inc., 1997)
2. Ibid.
3. Calculated from Moody's Investor
Services, Industrial Manual, Bond Survey
4. Peter J. Ferrara, Pension Liberation,
American Legislative Exchange Council, State Factor, 1996
5. Ibid.
|